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PROFESSOR CHARLES H. LIVENGOOD, JR.: I took due note,
as I am sure all of you did, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Section and
Distinguished Guests, of the not-very-subtle reference to the verbose Senator. I trust I shall avoid any further suggestion that I am comparable to
him.
It may have been the same Senator who was riding home with his wife
one evening and, in an expansive mood, having been honored in the course
of the dinner, informed her, "My dear, you know, there are very few men
in this world of distinguished presence and probing perception."
And she promptly said, "Yes, and there is one less than you think."
[Laughter]
Now, let me assure you that I do not compare myself with that Senator
either.
This is an almost impossible task which I undertake in the effort within
the time which your patience will permit me to review the entire term of
the Supreme Court, even in the single area of labor law. Nevertheless I
shall attempt, albeit superficially, at least to refresh your recollection and
perhaps pull together for you some of the things which our High Court has
done.
Last fall, at the beginning of the 1967 Term, it appeared that the year
which has just passed was likely to be one of frenetic activity and significant law-making on the part of the Supreme Court in the area of labor law.,
Before the close of the Court's 1966 Term, it had aireed L'ready to review
six cases of potential importance. By October there were 66 cases on its
docket which presented questions of substantial interest to labor lawyers.
Before the Term ended on June 17, the Court had received 155 petitions
for certiorari involving labor law issues. In short, there was considerable
reason to anticipate a major year in labor law history.
The actual course of events was somewhat disappointing to those who
anticipated definitive answers to a lot of troublesome labor relations questions. Activity there was-the Court took final action on 135 petitions, 42
more than during its preceding Term. However, while hindsight may dic'See, e.g., BNA, Labor Relations Reporter, 66 Analysis 17 (1967).
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tate a different conclusion, the 1967 Term appears to have been "distinguished more by the variety than the importance of the issues re2
solved."
Let me hasten to say that the Term did not fail to produce some
important-and controversial-decisions. The Court handed down 15 labor
law opinions, disposing of 18 petitions-in addition to per curiam orders
which dealt with the issues posed by two other petitions, and orders
denying review in the remaining 115 cases where final action was taken.
Twenty cases were carried over to the 1968 Term, including five in which
review already has been granted. 3 While the magnitude of the issues actually resolved was hardly overwhelming, there was-as Professor Sanford
Kadish aptly observed when he addressed this group in Montreal two years
ago- "sustenance enough for those who labor in the field, and even more
4
for judicial head-hunters on ceremonial reunions of the tribe.'"
In beginning this review, I suggested that the Court's 1967 labor decisions were notable for their variety. The Taft-Hartley Act produced four
opinions and one per curiam order by the Court. Other decisions involved
a broad spectrum of legislation which included the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act, the Railway Labor Act, the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Three of the Court's
1967 decisions, disposing of four cases, were based on constitutional
grounds.
2BNA,
3Cases

Labor Relations Reporter, 68 Analysis 33 (1968).
carried over in which review has been granted include: NLRB v. Strong,
No. 1339 (authority of NLRB to require retroactive. payment of fringe benefits
which employer would have had to pay had he not unlawfully refused to sign
contract negotiated in his behalf by multi-employer group); Railroad Trainmen v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., No. 1378 (power of state court to enjoin, as violation of
state law, peaceful picketing by railroad employees of terminal facilities owned and
used jointly by struck and non-struck railroads, in connection with ....
major dispute" under Railway Labor Act); Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., No. 1193
(necessity of exhausting internal and administrative remedies as prerequisite to suit
in federal court by railroad employees alleging racial discrimination in employment); Hardin v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Rr., No. 973, and Locomotive Firemen v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Rr., No. 950 (validity of state minimum train crew statutes
under commerce clause of federal Constitution).
In addition to the cases mentioned, recent developments in connection with
authorization-card bargaining orders and the Excelsior names-and-addresses rule
raise the distinct possibility that these, and other much-debated issues which were
denied
review in 1967, may be considered during the 1968 Term.
4Kadish,
Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 1966 Proceedings of the ABA Labor Relations Law Section.
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Before turning our attention to individual cases, one further general
observtion is perhaps appropriate. For the second successive year, the
National Labor Relations Board was successful in all cases to which it was
a party. This rather impressive batting average involved six cases during
the 1966 Term, and four in 1967. The government was also the victor in
the three 1967 Landrum-Griffin cases, and the FLSA case, to which the
Secretary of Labor was a party.
A.

The Taft-Hartley Act

As usual, the Taft-Hartley Act led the field, both in the number of
decisions rendered and the number of petitions filed. 5 ILGWU Local 415
v. Scherer & Sons, Inc.6 did not give the Court much pause. The Florida
District Court of Appeal had ruled that the Garment Workers' picketing of
a Florida employer, and its use of secondary as well as primary economic
pressures, to compel the employer to contract with the union and to
enforce an industry agreement forbidding subcontracting of work to nonunion shops, was enjoinable by the state court under the right-to-work clause
of the Florida Constitution. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed
the judgment below by a per curiam order, deeming the issue presented to
be foreclosed by well-established principles of primary jurisdiction and
federal preemption. 7
The Court took more time-but not much-to explain its reversal of
another Florida decision involving alleged conflict between state and federal legislation. In Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the question
presented was whether a state could refuse to pay unemployment insurance to a claimant solely because an unfair labor practice charge filed in
connection with her discharge was pending before the NLRB. The Florida
Industrial Commission ruled that filing of the charge by a union on behalf
5

1n addition to the six Taft-Hartley cases decided (two of them in a single
opinion), 68 petitions for certiorari involving the Act were denied.
6 No.

7The

400, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 690, 1402 (1968).

Court regarded its decision as adequately explained by citation of Retail
Clerks International Assoc. v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 84 S.Ct. 219 (1963) and
Local No. 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 83 S.Ct. 531 (1963). In the Schermerhorn
litigation, the Court had made explicit what its earlier decisions implied: that,
although Section 14(b) authorizes the states to prohibit union security agreements,
they cannot employ such a prohibition as a justification for state sanctions against
concerted organizational activities which are arguably within the ambit of federal
law, except in connection with the actual negotiation or administration of a contract
offensive to the law of the state.
"No. 48, 1967 'term; 88 S.Ct. 362 (1967).
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of the claimant brought her within the disqualification provisions of the
state's Unemployment Compensation Act because her unemployment then
became attributable to a "labor dispute"; 9 and the state Court of Appeal
denied review of the Commission's ruling. Observing that the machinery of
the NLRB is not self'starting and that someone must file a charge before
the Board can act, the Supreme Court concluded that an important constitutional question was involved: "specifically whether the Commission's
ruling violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Art. VI, cl.2)
because it allegedly 'frustrates' enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq." The Court answered this question
affirmatively and reversed, relying on the language of a long line of cases
dating back to McCulloch v. Maryland'0 and including Hill v. Florida."
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black said:
"We have no doubt that coercive actions which the Act forbids
employers and unions to take against persons making charges are
likewise prohibited to be taken by the States ....It appears obvious to
us that this financial burden which Florida imposes will impede resort
12
to the Act and thwart congressional reliance on individual action."'
In basing its decision on the Supremacy Clause, the Court evaded the
more complex and intriguing questioh posed by the petitioner's alternative
argument that the Florida ruling violated her privileges and immunities of
United States citizenship in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Black's words, quoted above, presaged the Court's holding
in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 22.13 In reversing a decision by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the union restrained
and coerced a member in the exercise of his Section 7 rights, thus violating
Section 8(b)(1)(A), by expelling him for filing charges against the union
9

The Florida Unemployment Compensation Act, § 443.06, typically provides
that "an individual shall be disqualified for benefits ...(4) For any week with
respect to which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due
to a labor dispute .. "
'0 See 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819).
"See 325 U.S. 538, 542, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 1375 (1945).
12The Court rejected the argument that the petitioner might enjoy a windfall if
she was paid unemployment benefits and later awarded back pay by the NLRB. In
doing so, it relied on its earlier assurance, perhaps more theoretical than real, that a
state can recoup such benefits if paid for a period covered by a subsequent
back-pay award. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 365 n.1, 71 S.Ct. 337,
340 (1951).
13No. 796, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 1717 (1968).
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with the NLRB without having first exhausted internal union procedures.
The basic philosophy which governed the Nash case seems to have been
the decisive factor in the Marine and Shipbuilding Workers case. As the
Court rephrased it:
A proceeding by the Board is not to adjudicate private rights but to
effectuate a public policy. The Board cannot initiate its own proceedings; implementation of the Act is dependent "upon the initiative of
individual persons." Nash v. Florida IndustrialCommission, 389 U.S.
235, 238. The policy of keeping people "completely free from coercion," id., against making complaints to the Board is therefore important in the functioning of the Act as an organic whole.
While Nash and Shipbuilding Workers thus have much in common, the
issues in the latter case were considerably more intricate, its result much
less predictable, and its implications far more elusive.
The Court of Appeals-and Mr. Justice Stewart, who agreed with that
court's opinion in dissenting from the Supreme Court's -decision-were
persuaded that the proviso of Taft-Hartley Section 8(b)(1)(A),14 together
with Landrum-Griffin Section 101(a)(4), 15 authorized the union to require-as it did by its constitution-that every member should exhaust his
remedies within the union before resorting to an outside tribunal. Delivering the Supreme Court's decision, Mr. Justice Douglas conceded that the
statutory language was susceptible to this reading, and that there was
legislative history which tended to support it. However, he regarded the
legislative history as inconclusive and found that it was outweighed by the
thrust of the Act as a whole.
The Court of Appeals had recognized that its decision-unless qualified- might mean that issues of public policy would never be presented for
decision, and stated that resort to intra-union remedies would not be
required if it "would impose unreasonable delay or hardship upon the
complainant." This did not satisfy Mr. Justice Douglas, who replied:
The difficulty is that a member would have to guess what a court
ultimately would hold. If he guessed wrong and filed the charge with
"Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein;...."
15"No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute
an action in any court or in a proceeding before any administrative agency...:
Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization,
before instituting legal or administrative proceedings.... "
14
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the Board without exhausting internal union procedures, he would
have no recourse against the discipline of the union. That risk alone is
likely to chill the exercise of a member's right to a Board remedy .... That is the judgment of the Board; and we think it comports
with the policy of the Act. That is to say, the proviso in § 8(b)(J)(A)
that unions may design their own rules respecting "the acquisition or
retention of membership" is not so broad as to give the union power to
penalize a member who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter
that is in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the
union.
The Court of Appeals found support for its contrary position in
§ 101 (a)(4) .... While that provision prohibits a union from limiting the
right of a member "to institute an action in any court or in a proceeding before any administrative agency," it provides that a member "may
be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures" "not to exceed
a four-month lapse of time."
We conclude that "may be required" is not a grant of authority to
unions more firmly to police their members but a statement of policy
that the public tribunals whose aid is invoked may in their discretion
stay their hands for four months, while the aggrieved person seeks
relief within the union.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the Marine and Shipbuilding Workers
result, agreed (on the basis of the legislative history) that a court or agency
could entertain the complaint of a union member even though available
intra-union procedures had not been exhausted. However, he took issue
with the implication which he found in the Court's opinion that a distinction should be made between complaints concerning purely internal
union affairs and those touching "the public domain covered by the Act."
"[T]his dichotomy has," he said, "precisely the disadvantage that the
Court has found in the Third Circuit's construction.. .: it compels a
member to gamble his union membership, and often his employment, on
the accuracy of his understanding of the federal labor laws." Mr. Justice
Harlan did feel it appropriate to add the caveat that "courts and agencies
will frustrate an important purpose of the 1959 legislation if they do not, in
fact, regularly compel union members 'to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures' within the union organization."
I am extremely diffident about my powers of prescience. However, I
venture to suggest that Marine and Shipbuilding Workers may be the most
significant and controversial of the Court's 1967 Taft-Hartley decisions -involving as it does such provocative issues as judicial obeisance to
Board determinations, the use of fragmentary and ambivalent legislative
history to justify debatable statutory construction, and the pervasive problem of accommodating responsible union self-government with the protec-
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tion of individual and public interests. On the other hand, it is conceivable
that the case will be closely restricted (,3
its particular facts. The original
complaint of the union member alleged discrimination by the employer as
well as a union officer and, as the Court observed in partial defense of its
holding, issues and remedies involving an employer "cannot be fully explored in an internal union proceeding."
To concurring Justices Harlan and Stewart, the issue presented in
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co. 16 was a simple one, and its answer
obvious. I agree. The case would deserve no more than passing comment
were it not for the fact that the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Fortas,
went out of its way to resolve some of the ambiguities in NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers 7 -a case which was neatly dissected for you by Father
Dexter Hanley when he addressed this group in Honolulu last year." R
In Fleetwood, the Court reversed a ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals that the employer did not violate Taft-Hartley Sections 8(a)(l) and
8(a)(3) when he hired new applicants two months after the end of an
economic strike, instead of reinstating strikers who were qualified and
available. The strikers in question had first applied for reinstatement when
a collective bargaining agreement terminated the stoppage, but at that time
production had been temporarily curtailed because of the strike. As full
operations were gradually resumed, further offers by the strikers to return
to work were rejected. The Ninth Circuit held that the right of the strikers
to jobs should be determined as of the date when they first applied, at the
strike's end when no jobs were available, and that thereafter the employer
committed no unfair labor practice so long as he treated their applications
on the same basis as those of other applicants. This position seems clearly
untenable. Section 2(3) of the Act provides that an individual whose work
has ceased in consequence of a current19 labor dispute continues to be an
employee if he has not obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment; and, obviously, refusal of available work to an ex-striker tends
to discourage organization and the exercise of other Section 7 rights. As
the Trial Examiner succinctly concluded, the employer's error was to view
the strikers "only as applicants for employment who were entitled to no
16 No. 49, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 543 (1967).
17388 U.S. 26, 87 S.Ct. 1792 (1967).
18Hanley,
Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 1967 Proceedings of the ABA Labor Relations Law Section.
19One can quibble over the significance of the word "current" in the instant
context but the Supreme Court, justifiably I think, did not see enough substance in
the point for comment.
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more than nondiscriminatory consideration for job openings. But they had
a different standing-they were employees."
The concurring Justices would have stopped here, in reversing the Circuit Court and sustaining the Board's finding of 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations. However, the Circuit Court, as an obbligato to its major theme, had
adverted to the problems of "legitimate business justification" and "employer motivation" -and the Supreme Court majority elected to elaborate
its views on these questions, perhaps because of the speculation which had
been aroused by Great Dane.
In that case, said Mr. Justice Fortas for the Court, "we held that proof
of antiunion motivation is unnecessary when the employer's conduct 'could
have adversely affected employee rights to some extent' and when the
employer does not meet his burden of establishing 'that he was motivated
by legitimate objectives'. . ,.[B]ecause the employer here has not shown
'legitimate and substantial business justifications,' the conduct constitutes
an unfair labor practice without reference to intent."
The Court also took occasion to observe-albeit by way of footnote-that the Board was not required to show that the jobs of the complainants in Fleetwood were still available. Again citing Great Dane, the
Court said, "Such proof is not essential to establish an unfair labor practice. It relates to justification, and the burden of such proof is on the
employer."
While the significance of Fleetwood is far from crystal clear, it suggests
the following generalizations: (1) The presumption that a man intended the
natural and probable consequences of his conduct is strongly viable in the
context of unfair labor practices-specifically, Section 8(a)(3). (2) While
the presumption can be rebutted by "legitimate and substantial business
justifications," such justification is an affirmative defense, involving facts
peculiarly within the knowledge of the respondent employer, and the latter
has the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of coming forward with
evidence. (3) "Legitimate and substantial business justifications" are characterized (to use the examples cited by Mr. Justice Fortas) by such things
as "permanent replacements during the strike in order to continue operations," "the need to adapt to changes in business conditions or to improve
efficiency," and similar situations "when the striker's job has been eliminated for substantial and bona fide reasons other than considerations relating to labor relations."
In NLRB v.United Insurance Company of America 20 and Insurance

20

No. 178, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 988 (1968).
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Workers InternationalUnion v. NLRB, 21 the Court was presented with the
apparently inexhaustible question of who are employees for purposes of
contemporary labor legislation. Specifically, the issue in these cases, which
were dealt with in a common opinion, was whether the "debit agents" of an
insurance company should be deemed "independent contractors," exempted from Taft-Hartley by Section 2(3), or whether, on the contrary, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should have enforced the Board's order
that the company bargain with the debit agents' union, which had been
22
certified as the representative of these "employees."
A quarter-century ago, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that the question of who are employees "must be
answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation." 2 3 This criterion-sometimes called the "economic realities"
test-still survives in determining the reach of some labor laws, notably the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 24 However, the sponsors of Taft-Hartley were
distinctly disturbed by the Hearst decision-partly because it rejected the
equation of employer-employee with the ancient concepts of master and
servant, and partly because they felt the Court had exhibited an unseemly
deference to the NLRB and had abdicated judicial responsibility for the
interpretation of a statutory term. They promptly inserted in the 1947
NLRA amendments an exclusion of "independent contractors" from the
definition of "employee." The meaning of this insertion, on its face, was
not beyond cavil; however, the Board and the Courts conceded that its
purpose was to insure the application of common-law principles in distinguishing employees from independent contractors. The Court reaffirms
this acquiescence in the instant case, saying "there is no doubt that we
should apply the common-law agency test here." The Court makes a
further conciliatory gesture in observing that "such a determination of pure
21 No.
22

179, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 988 (1968).

Section 2(3) provides that the "term 'employee' ... shall not include.

. .

any

individual having the status of an independent contractor." Section 8(a)(5) declares
that it "shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
section 9(a)." Section 9(a) stipulates that representatives selected by the majority of
employees in an appropriate unit "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining." Section 9(c)
directs the Board, upon finding that a question of representation exists, to conduct
an election and "certify the results thereof."
23322 U.S. 111, 124, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944).
24
See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct. 1473
(1947); Asia, Employment Relation: Common Law Concept and Legislative Definition, 55 Yale L. J. 76 (1946).
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agency law involved no special administrative expertise that a court does
not possess."
Having thus observed the amenities, the Court proceeded to sustain the
Board's conclusion that the debit agents were employees, and reversed the
Seventh Circuit's refusal to enforce the Board's order. It reiterated Mr.
Justice Rutledge's observation in the Hearst case that the master-servant
concept had never been as simple as commonly supposed, 25 and pointed
out that in the instant case there was substantial evidence of such relevant
factors as integration with -the company's normal operations, minimal requirements of skill except as provided by company training, permanency
and exclusiveness of service, extensive supervision and guidance by managerial personnel, and limitation of independent discretion. In the final
analysis, the Court fell back on the doctrine of Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 26 and concluded:
Here the least that can be said for the Board's decision is that it made
a choice between two fairly conflicting views, and under these circumstances the Court of Appeals should have enforced the Board's order.
It was error to refuse to do S0.27
What does the United Insurance case prove? Not much-except that
judicial and administrative tribunals will continue to be plagued by the
hybrid factuo-legal question of what is an employee so long as we continue
our anachronistic adherence to the old master-servant concept as the
touchstone for determining the reach of modern social legislation.
B.

Bill of Rights Cases

Two other decisions of the Court during its 1967 Term involved potential Taft-Hartley issues but were determined on other grounds. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 28 a
divided Pennsylvania court had sustained an injunction against peaceful
picketing of the porch, pick-up zone, parking spaces and other areas in the
vicinity of a supermarket located in a privately-owned shopping center. No
25See
26340

27The

ALl, Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 220 (1958).
U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951).

Court of Appeals was irritated by the Trial Examiner's indiscreet remark
that the debit agents waiting to testify before him exhibited a deference toward
company officials characteristic of employees, and felt that this vicarious dictum
tainted the whole record. The Supreme Court e!ected to ignore this abrasive and
superfluous
comment.
28
No. 478, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 1601 (1968).
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issue was raised as to the manner or purpose of the picketing, which
inforned the public that the store was non-union and paid substandard
wages. The state appellate court sustained the injunction on the sole
ground that the picketing was a trespass on the property of the store and
shopping center owners. This ruling was attacked on the grounds (I) that
the picketing was either protected or prohibited by Taft-Hartley, so that
the issues presented lay within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, and
(2) that the injunction abridged freedom of speech in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court reversed, relying on the
free-speech argument, and did not reach the preemption problem.
The Thornhill 29 and Marsh30 decisions of the 1940's-notwithstanding
their attenuation in subsequent ctses 3 ' -provided some reason to anticipate the decision in Logan Valley. Hiowever, the result was by no means a
foregone conclusion, as reflected by the fact that Logan Valley produced
five opinions, including three dissents and one concurrence.
Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, found the instant case
strikingly similar to the Marsh case, which had recognized the First
Amendment right of a Jehovah's Witness to distribute religious literature in
the business district of Chickasaw, Alabama, even though that company
town was wholly owned by a private corporation. Relying mainly on the
Marsh case, he said:
.... [I]t may well be that respondents' ownership of the property here
in question gives them various rights, under the laws of Pennsylvania,
to limit the use of that property by members of the public in a manner
that would not be permissible were the property owned by a municipality. All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as
the community business block "and is freely accessible and open to
the people in the area and those passing through,". . . the State may
not delegate the power, through the use of its trepass laws, wholly to
exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First
Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose
generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion, presumably be29

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). See also AFL v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568 (1941).
30
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946).
31
See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 77 S.Ct. 1166
(1957); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476 (1964); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct.
1335 (1968).
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cause he did not regard as necessary or appropriate all of the elaborate
explanations in the Court's opinion and considered the Marsh case adequate precedent. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, would have preferred to
deal with the case on preemption grounds. Since the posture in which the
case was presented would not permit this, as he reluctantly conceded, he
concluded that the Court should exercise its discretion not to reach the
First Amendment issue and should dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Justices Black and White, though they wrote two separate dissents,
were agreed that the Marsh case was distinguishable and were concerned
about where the majority's extension of that case might logically lead.
They would limit Marsh to the situation where property has taken on all of
the attributes of a town - residential areas, streets, a sewer system, etc. - so
that for practical purposes it could be regarded as functioning like a
state-created municipality. Otherwise, said Mr. Justice White:
It is not clear how the Court might draw a line between "shopping
I am fearful that the
Court's decision today will be a license for pickets to leave the public
centers" and other business establishments ....

streets and carry out their activities on private property ....

I do not

agree that when the owner of private property invites the public to do
business with him he impliedly dedicates his property for other uses as
well.
Perhaps I have said enough to suggest the scope of the provocative
questions which Logan Valley leaves open. This is not the time to attempt
a reasoned prediction of its ramifications, and I must leave you to your
own speculations.
In United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Assoc.,32 the union had been enjoined from engaging in practices alleged to
constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The injunction was premised
upon undisputed evidence that the union employed a licensed attorney on a
salary basis to represent any of its members who desired to use his services
in prosecuting workmen's compensation claims under the Illinois act. The
Illinois courts rejected the union's contentions (1) that the decree abridged
their freedom of speech, petition and assembly under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) that the decree violated union members'
rights to engage in concerted activities, as guaranteed by Taft-Hartley
Section 7. The Supreme Court reversed on the basis of First Amendment
considerations, and did not reach the Taft-Hartley question.
The Court, per Black, J., ruled that the instant case was controlled by

32

No. 33, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 353 (1967).
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NAACP v. Button 3 and InternationalBhd. of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar.3 4 The fact that the Button case was "bound up with
political matters of acute social moment," and that in Trainmen the attorney was merely recommended and not actually paid by the union, was not
regarded as sufficient to distinguish those cases from the present one. The
Court conceded that "the States have broad power to regulate the practice
of law" in order "to protect the public and to preserve respect for the
administration of justice." However, it concluded that, on balance, the
state's interest was outweighed by the fundamental character of the First
Amendment rights invoked, the demonstrated need of the mine workers for
the mutual protection afforded by the plan, the doubtful availability of any
superior method of providing such protection, the plan's long history of
satisfactory operation, and the minimal potential for conflicts of interest or
other abuses. "The decree at issue here," said the Court, "thus substantially impairs the associational rights of the mine workers and is not needed
to protect the State's interest in high standards of legal ethics."
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the result on the sole ground that the
Trainmen case was controlling. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, as he had in
the Button case. He agreed with the "balancing approach" employed by
the majority, but found that the scales tipped differently. In his opinion, the
alleged needs of the mine workers could be met by arrangements more
consistent with the views of the Illinois courts and the American Bar
Association3 5 as to what is appropriate to protect the public interest in a
regulated bar.
Without getting involved in detail, about all I can say about the Illinois
Bar decision is that it will surely send cold chills up the spines of those
who view with alarm the advent of socialized law in the wake of socialized
medicine.
One other constitutional decision perhaps deserves brief mention here,
although its relation to labor law is peripheral. In Mancusi v. De Forte,3 6
the Court affirmed a ruling by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that a
union official had standing to challenge the state's use of incriminating
union records seized from his union office, though not his personal proper33371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328 (1963).
34377 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1113 (1964).
35Cf.

ABA Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, Information Opinion No. A of 1950, 36 A.B.A.J. 677; ABA Committee on Professional Ethics,

Informal Opinion No. 469 (Dec. 26, 1961); 1964 ABA Reports 381-383 (Special
Committee on Ethical Standards); 1966 ABA Reports 589-594 (Special Committee
on36Availability of Legal Services).
No. 844, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 2120 (1968).
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ty; that the seizure of such records pursuant to subpoena duces tecum but
without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and that he was
entitled to relief in federal habeas corpus proceedings challenging the final
state court judgment of conviction.
C.

The FairLabor Standards Act

For the first time in nearly three decades, a major constitutional attack
was mounted against the Federal Wage and Hour Law. The litigation was
provoked by the 1961 and 1966 amendments which extended the Act's
coverage to schools, colleges, hospitals and medical-care facilities, including those owned and operated by a state. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 37 with
two Justices dissenting, the Court rebuffed 28 states which had joined in an
attempt to invalidate this extension of the minimum wage, overtime compensation, child labor, equal pay, record keeping and other requirements of
the federal statute.
The plaintiffs made four basic contentions: (1) that the "enterprise" test
of coverage introduced in 1961 exceeded the powers of Congress under the
Commerce Clause; (2) that coverage of state-operated schools and hospitals was beyond the commerce power; (3) that the remedial provisions of
the Act, insofar as they would authorize private suits against the states in
the federal courts, would conflict with the Eleventh Amendment; and (4)
that even if the constitutional arguments were rejected, the Court should
declare that schools and hospitals do not have the statutorily required
relationship to interstate commerce.
The attack on the enterprise criterion of coverage gave the Court little
difficulty, although that test means that, unlike the situation before the
1961 amendment, some employees will be protected by the Act even
though not individually engaged in commerce or production therefor, provided fellow employees in the same enterprise are so engaged.
"Elucidating litigation" has long since established that the Commerce
Clause empowers Congress to control activities which affect interstate
commerce though not intrinsically a part of it. 3 8 As to the issues involving
the Eleventh Amendment and statutory construction, the Supreme Court
agreed with the court below that the plaintiffs' contentions were premature,
and that resolution of these issues should not be attempted in the abstract
context of a declaratory judgment suit but should be deferred until an
actual case required their decision.
37
No. 742, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 2017 (1968).
3
aSee, e.g., U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451 (1941); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937).
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Thus the instant case boiled down to the elementary problem of federalism presented by the plaintiffs' contention that application of national
wage and hour standards to state employees was an indefensible interference with "sovereign state functions." As to this central issue, the
position of the Court is perhaps reasonably well reflected in the following
quotation from the Court's opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan:
[A]ppellants' characterization of the question in this case as whether
Congress may, under the guise of the commerce power, tell the States
how to perform medical and educational functions is not factually
accurate. Congress has "interfered with" these state functions only to
the extent of providing that when a State employs people in performing such functions it is subject to the same restrictions as a wide
range of other employers whose activities affect commerce, including
privately operated schools and hospitals.
The court cited abund4nt statistical data to support its conclusion that
labor conditions in schools and hospitals affect commerce, and an extensive array of cases 39 deemed to establish the proposition that "[i]f a State is
engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal
Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be
forced to conform its activities to federal regulation." Specifically, the
Court declared that the "principle of United States v. California4 0 is
controlling here." In that case the Court had unanimously held that a
non-profit, intrastate railroad operated by the state was subject to the
Federal Safety Appliance Act, observing that "we think it unimportant to
say whether the state conducts its railroads in its 'sovereign' or in its
'private' capacity."
Justices Douglas and Stewart, dissenting in the present case, felt that the
FLSA 1966 amendments will "disrupt the fiscal policy of the States and
threaten their autonomy." As Mr. Justice Douglas put it:
The Court's opinion skillfully brings employees of state-owned enterprises within the reach of the Commerce Clause; and as an exercise
in semantics it is unexceptionable if congressional federalism is the
standard. But what is done here is nonetheless such a serious invasion
of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in
my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism.
39See,

e.g., Sanitary District of Chicago v. U.S., 266 U.S. 405, 45 S.Ct. 176

(1925); Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050 (1941); Board of

Trustees of University of Illinois v._U.S., 289 U.S. 48, 53 S.Ct. 509 (1933).
40297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421 (1936).
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The dissenters described the cases relied upon by the majority as "simply
not apropos," and suggested that the guiding principles should be found in
the several opinions in New York v. U.S.,41 where a divided court held that
the federal government could tax the sale of mineral waters owned and
marketed by the state.
One of the implications of Matyland v. Wirtz is that, if the states and
their subdivisions do not find palliatives for the currently vexatious problem of labor-management relations in the public sector, Congress may be
tempted to step in and assert its own policies.
D.

The Landrum-Griffin Act

All of the Court's 1967 Landrum-Griffin decisions arose out of suits by
the Secretary of Labor under Section 402 to void union elections and
require that new elections be conducted under the Secretary's supervision.
Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assoc. 42 and Wirtz v. Local
125, Laborers' Int. Union of North America 43 both raised the question of
whether the union's holding of a new election rendered moot the Secretary's action challenging the validity of the prior election. In each case, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision below, and held that neither a literal
reading of the statute nor a consideration of its legislative history and
general objectives would support the Circuit Court's holding that upon the
occurrence of another unsupervised election the Secretary's cause of action should be deemed to have "ceased to exist." With considerable persuasiveness, the Court observed in the Bottle Blowers case:
... Congress unequivocally declared that once the Secretary establishes in court that a violation of § 401 may have affected the outcome
of the challenged election, "the court shall declare the election ... to
be void and direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of
the Secretary. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 482(c). (Emphasis supplied.)

We cannot agree that this statutory scheme is satisfied by the
happenstance intervention of an unsupervised election. The notion
that the unlawfulness infecting the challenged election should be considered as washed away by the following election disregards Congress'
evident conclusion that only a supervised election could offer assurance that the officers who achieved office as beneficiaries of violations
of the Act would not by some means perpetuate their unlawful control
in the succeeding election.
41326 U.S. 572, 66 S.Ct. 310 (1946).
42
No. 57, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 643 (1968).

43No.

58, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 639 (1968).
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The Laborers' Union case involved the additional issue of whether the
Secretary's power to bring a Section 402 suit is limited to the specific
allegation made by a complaining union member and to the particular
election challenged by the complainant. Here, the complainant had challenged only a runoff election on July 13 for the office of business representative, on the ground that members not in good standing had been permitted to vote. The Secretary's investigation disclosed that a similar irregularity, with respect to both voting and candidacy for office, had occured in
the preceding general election on June 8. The Court held that "[oln the
facts of this case we think the Secretary is entitled to maintain his action
challenging the June 8 general election because respondent union had fair
notice from the violation charged by Dial [the complainant] in his protest
of the runoff election that the same unlawful conduct also occurred at the
earlier election." In adopting this view, the Court rejected the union's
contention that the Secretary's suit should be limited solely to the allegations made by the complainant. At the same time, the Court declined to
pass upon the Secretary's argument that "a member's protest triggers a
§ 402 enforcement action in which the Secretary would be permitted to file
suit challenging any violation of § 401 discovered in his investigation of the
member's complaint." The merits of this broader construction of the Secretary's authority-which the Court again declined to discuss in the case next
cited-must be deemed still open to debate.
In Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6,44 the
Court explored (1) the meaning of "reasonable qualifications" as used in
the Section 401(e) guarantee that "every member in good standing shall be
eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to ... reasonable
qualifications uniformly imposed)," and (2) the significance of the phrase
"may have affected the outcome" as used in Section 402(c) to limit the
category of irregularities which require that an election be voided. The
subject of the Court's inquiry was a local bylaw which limited eligibility for
major elective offices to members who then, or had previously, occupied
responsible positions in the union hierarchy. The Court held that the
restriction was not reasonable, that its enforcement may have affected the
outcome of the election, and that the Secretary of Labor was therefore
entitled to an order directing a new election under his supervision.
In dealing with the "reasonable qualifications" issue, the Court took
note of the argument that there is some logic in restricting important union
offices to members with administrative experience and demonstrated ability. Unlike the Circuit Court, however, the Supreme Court did not find this
44No. 891, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 1743 (1968).
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argument persuasive. It reviewed the union's history in some detail and
concluded that the questioned bylaw gave the incumbent administration a
distinct potential for self-perpetuation. Said the Court, "Congress plainly
did not intend that the authorization in §401(e) of 'reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed' should be given a broad reach." In the specific
context of the case before it, the Court observed, "Plainly ... a candidacy
limitation which renders 93% of union members ineligible for office can
hardly claim to be a 'reasonable qualification'."
With respect to the "may have affected" issue, the Court concluded that
the purposes of the statute would be served "by ascribing to a proved
violation of § 401 the effect of establishing a prima facie case that the
violation 'may have affected' the outcome. This effect may, of course, be
met by evidence which supports a finding that the violation did not affect
the result." The Court took pains to emphasize, however, that the presumption it was creating could be rebutted only by evidence with inherent
probative value, and that considerations involving mere conjecture would
not suffice.
The Court recognized here, as it had in the other two Landrum-Griffin
decisions, that its basic task was to accommodate Congressional interest in
eliminating revealed abuses in union elections with minimal intervention in
internal union affairs, and thus to achieve the objective of democratic and
responsible self-government. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinions in
all three cases.
E. The Norris-LaGuardiaAct
When certiorari was granted last October, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
No. 735, IAM 45 appeared to hold out the promise of some containment of
the forensic fireworks about whether injunctive relief is available against
strikes in breach of-contract. Instead, the ultimate decision may have
added fuel to the flames by exacerbating the dispute over Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 46 where the Court by a 5-3 decision had held that although
a suit for breach of a no-strike clause was properly in the federal district
court by virtue of Taft-Hartley Section 301, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
barred that court from issuing an injunction.
In the present case, the company sued in a Tennessee court to enjoin a
strike which allegedly violated its contract with the union, and the state
court issued an ex parte injunction. The union then removed the case to the
federal district court, which denied a motion to remand and dissolved the
injunction. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating inter alia
45No. 445, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 1235 (1968).
46370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328 (1962).
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that "the remedies available in State Courts [in Section 301 suitsJ are
limited to the remedies available under Federal law."
The Supreme Court's opinion, per Douglas, J., reiterated the
well-established proposition that a Section 301 action is controlled by
federal substantive law even though it is brought in a state court, 47 and
asserted that it was thus clear that the company's claim was one arising
under the "laws of the United States" within the meaning of the removal
statute and likewise clear that the suit was within the "original jurisdiction"
of the federal district court. 48 With respect to the claim that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as interpreted in Sinclair, denied jurisdiction to the
federal court, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches is of
course, different from the question whether there is jurisdiction to
adjudicate the controversy .... [That] is a distinct question from
whether the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter.
Since the district court had denied the motion to remand, and had
dissolved the state court's injunction on undisclosed grounds, the Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to rule on the critical question posed by the
Circuit Court's assertion that "the remedies available in State Courts are
limited to the remedies available under Federal law." This statement the
Court classified as mere obiter dictum, and concurring Justices Stewart,
Harlan and Brennan took occasion to emphasize that "the Court expressly
reserves decision on the effect of Sinclair in the circumstances presented
by this case." They then proceeded to compound the confusion by adding
that the "Court will, no doubt, have an opportunity to reconsider the scope
and continuing validity of Sinclair upon an appropriate future occasion."
It is doubtful that either employers or unions can, with confidence, find
much comfort in the A vco decision.
The storm of controversy which has swirled around the Sinclair case
ever since it was decided is also reflected by the opinions in International
Longshoremen's Assoc., Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assoc.,
two cases which the Court disposed of in a joint decision. 49 Here the
employer had obtained in the federal district court an order that an arbitrator's award, which sustained the employer's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, "be specifically enforced." The union contended
that the district court's order was an injunction against work stoppages and
47Humphrey

48
See
49

v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363 (1964).

28 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1441.
Nos. 34 and 73, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 201 (1967).
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relied on the Sinclair holding that a federal court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin
a strike even when the applicable contract contains a no-strike clause.
However, the Court elected not to deal with the significant question of
whether a federal court can enforce an arbitrator's award even though the
practical effect would be the same as that of a prohibited injunction.
Instead, it based its decision on Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that any order "granting an injunction and
every restraining order. . shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in
reasonable detail ... the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . ." The
Court observed, in its opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, that the award
contained "only an abstract conclusion of law, not an operative command,"
and that the district judge had rebuffed persistent.efforts by union counsel
to ascertain just what the court's order required the union to do. The Court
held that the order was too vague to satisfy Rule 65(d), and that with it
must fall the district court's decision holding the union in contempt.
"Whether or not the District Court's order was an 'injunction' within the
meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," said the Court, "it was an equitable decree compelling obedience under the threat of contempt and was
therefore an 'order granting an injunction' within the meaning of Rule
65(d)."
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, would have remanded for more
precise findings. Disagreeing with the majority, he said:
If the order of the District Court is an "injunction" within the
meaning of Rule 65(d), then I fail to see why it is not an "injunction"
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ... and since I feel
strongly that Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson. . . caused a severe
dislocation in the federal scheme of arbitration of labor disputes, I
think we should not set our feet on a path that may well lead to the
eventual reaffirmation of the principles of that case.
Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's result, but emphasized that it
"in no way implies that Sinclair. .. determines the applicability of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to an equitable decree carefully fashioned to enforce the award of an arbitrator."
F.

Other Cases

Three other cases I shall mention very briefly, simply to complete the
picture.
By a per curiam order in Eagar v. Magma Copper Co.,50 the Court
50

No. 659, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 503 (1967).
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reversed a ruling below that reemployed veterans are not entitled, under
Section 9(c) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, to recover
holiday and vacation pay from their employer, even though they would
have been eligible for paid vacations and holidays but for their military
service. Justices Douglas, Harlan and Stewart dissented on the ground that
the majority had failed to recognize a distinction, which the dissenters
found in the language and history of the statute, between the seniority
rights of reinstated servicemen and their entitlement to such fringe benefits
as those in question.
In Joint Industry Boardof ElectricalIndustry v. U.S., 51 a divided court
ruled that claims for a bankrupt employer's unpaid contributions to an
employees' annuity fund, though credited to the individual accounts of
designated workmen and required by the collective bargaining agreement,
were not entitled to priority as "wages... due to workmen" under Section
64(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.
It seems to me that the issues in the Eagar and Joint Industry Board
cases are close ones, for which creditable arguments can be made both
ways. However, their relation to the general law of labor relations is at
most tangential, and I leave their detailed exploration to another time and
place.
American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll and Carroll v. American
Federation of Musicians, jointly decided,5 2 add another chapter to the
history of the long and agonizing search for accommodation between the
respective policies of labor relations law and the Sherman Act. Discussion
of these cases will be limited to superficial comment for two reasons. In the
first place, this litigation, which began back in 1960, primarily involves
what Mr. Justice White (dissenting) described as "the peculiar role of
bandleaders and the peculiar economics of the club-date music industry."
In the second place, even a cursory examination of the intricacies of the
authorities and arguments upon which the majority and the dissent rely
would lead far beyond the intended scope and modest purpose of this
paper.
"The question," said Mr. Justice Brennan for the Court, "is whether
union practices... affecting orchestra leaders violate the Sherman Act as
activities in combination with a 'non-labor' group, or are exempted by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act as activities affecting a 'labor' group which is party
to a 'labor dispute'."
5

'No. 616, 1967 Term; 88 S.Ct. 1491 (1968).
5"Nos. 309 and 310; 88 S.Ct. 1562 (1968).
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The decisions below were premised on the assumption that, although
orchestra leaders in the club-date field were employers and independent
contractors, they were nevertheless a 'labor' group because of an econc-flic
relation with union members affecting legitimate union interests. The Supreme Court agreed that, conceptually, this was a proper point of departure. It therefore sustained the lower courts' rulings that it was lawful for
the union to force the orchestra leaders through economic pressure, to
acquiesce in a wide variety of restrictive practices. 3
The most divisive issue in the Carroll cases concerned the union's
insistence that orchestra leaders (whether they actually participated in an
appearance, or delegated the entire performance to subleaders and sidemen), as well as caterers and other booking agents, should observe a "Price
List" which established minimum fees for club-date engagements. The
District Court thought that "[i]n view of the competition between leaders
and sidemen and subleaders... the union has a legitimate interest in
fixing... minimum engagement prices." However, the Court of Appeals
(Judge Friendly dissenting) concluded that the "Price List" was outside the
labor exemption from the antitrust laws because its concern was prices and
not wages. The Supreme Court answered this with Mr. Justice White's
statement in Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewell
Tea Co.54 that "[tihe crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement - e.g., prices or wages - but its relative impact on the product market
and the interests of union members."
The Court majority went on to deplore the tendency to find in Jewell
Tea a magical equation between "mandatory subjects of collective bargaining" and the scope of labor's immunity from the antitrust laws. As the
majority put it:
53Specifically,

the Court held that "it was lawful for petitioners to pressure the
orchestra leaders to become union members [citing Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. U.S., 371 U.S. 94, 83 S.Ct. 162 (1962) and Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm' Prods., 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct. 122 (1940)], to
insist upon a closed shop [citing U.S. v. American Fed. of Musicians, 318 U.S.
741, 63 S.Ct. 665 (1943)], to refuse to bargain collective with the leaders [citing
Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 65 S.Ct. 1545 (1945)], to impose the minimum
employment quotas complained of [citing U.S. v American Fed. of Musicians
supra], to require the orchestra leaders to use the [standard] Form B contract
[citing Local 24, Int. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 362 U.S. 605, 80 S.Ct. 923
(1960)], and to favor local musicians by requiring that higher wages be paid to
musicians from outside a local's jurisdiction [citing Rambusch Decorating Co. v.
Brotherhood of Painters, 105 F2d 134 (2d Cir. 1939)]
54381

U.S. 676, 85 S.Ct. 1596 (1965).

SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW

Even if only mandatory subjects of bargaining enjoy the exemption-a
question not in this case and upon which we express no view-nothing
Mr. Justice White or Mr. Justice Goldberg said remotely suggests that
the distinction between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects turns
on the form of the method taken to protect a wage scale, here a price
floor.
For obvious reasons, the majority relied heavily on the decisions in
Local 24, InternationalBhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver (Oliver I and Oliver
!I),55 which indicated that "where independent contractors are doing work
for an employer in competition with the work of union members, the union
can bargain with the employer to make certain that they are not doing that
work at a lower wage." The dissenters (Justices White and Black) conceded that "Oliver is relevant," but regarded as decisive here the teaching
ot Allen Bradley and Pennington: that unions lose whatever antitrust immunity they might otherwise enjoy when they enter into combinations- whether voluntary or coerced-with entrepreneurs. 56 Said Mr.
Justice White:
I am sure the Clayton and Norris-LaGuar,, .t Acts never intended to
give unions this kind of stranglehold on any industry. It may be that
the Court views this industry as having special problems .... If this is
the case, the Court should frankly say so and ... leave to Congress

the task of making special provisions in the antitrust laws for the
special circumstances of the music industry.
Organized labor has come a long way in its 80-year war with the
trst-busters. It has won some major battles in the last three decades, and
it seems to have emerged with only minor casualties from the skirmishes
involved in the Carroll cases. I state the obvious, however, in observing
that the struggle between unions and the factions which would subject
them to the commands of the Sherman Act, and its progeny, has the
potential for longevity of our nation's current involvement with North Viet
Nam and its sympathizers in the Far East.
SUMMARY
This is the picture of the Supreme Court's posture in the labor law arena
at its 1967 Term-drawn with broad strokes, frankly uncritical, largely
impressionistic. Some of the decisions will undoubtably provide fodder for
79 S.Ct. 297 (1959); 362 U.S. 605, 80 S.Ct. 923 (1960).
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533
(1945); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct.
55358 U.S. 283,
56
- A]len

1585 (1965).
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reams of comment-student and professional-in the legal periodicals; for
example, Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, Fleetwood Trailer, Logan
Valle, Illinois State Bar, Maryland v. Wirtz, the Landrum-Griffin election
cases, A vco, and Carroll.
In several cases, involving relatively narrow issues, the Court faced up
to some tough questions and provided answers which, whether right or
wrong, were at least unequivocal.
In other cases, involving issues of more general interest and importance,
the Court chose to ignore opportunities to provide guidance, and opted for
less controversial bases of decision-creating doubts rather than resolving
them.
This, however, is the price we pay for the ad hoc system of judicial
law-making. It is a high price, but most of us are prepared to agree that, in
the juridical market of the world today, it still a good buy.

